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Despite the existence of a large Indian diaspora, there has been relatively little scholarly engagement with India’s 
relation to overseas Indians after its independence in 1947. The common narrative is that India abruptly cut ties 
with overseas Indians from that time until the 1990s, as it adhered to a territorially-based understanding of 
sovereignty and citizenship. By re-examining India’s relations with Indian communities in Ceylon and Burma 
between the late 1940s and the 1960s, this article demonstrates that, despite its rhetoric, India did not renounce its 
responsibility towards its diaspora at independence. To understand this continued engagement with overseas 
Indians, this article introduces the idea of post-imperial sovereignty. This type of sovereignty was layered, as 
imperial sovereignty had been, but was also concerned with advancing norms designed to protect migrant 
communities across the world.   
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Over the past two decades, new historical scholarship has recast the study of the Indian diaspora 
by reframing the Indian Ocean as an interconnected space. Historians have located overseas 
Indians within the functioning and development of a wider British imperial system in the 
region.1 They have explored the circulation of ideas, trade, and people in the Indian Ocean 
before and during colonial times.2 Further studies have analysed the diaspora’s subjective 
 
1 Robert Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-
1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
2 See Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006); Sunil Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the 
Fortunes of Migrants (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013); Pamela Gupta, Isabel Hofmeyr, and 
Michael Pearson, eds., Eyes across the Water: Navigating the Indian Ocean (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); Nile 
Green, Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840–1915 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). On specifically Tamil politics and connected histories across the Bay of Bengal, see 
Bhavani Raman, “The Postwar ‘Returnee,’ Tamil Culture, and the Bay of Bengal,” in The Postcolonial Moment 
in South and Southeast Asia, eds. Gian Prakash, Nikhil Menon, and Michael Laffan (London: Bloomsbury Press, 
2018), 121-140; Kalyani Ramnath, “Intertwined Itineraries: Debt, Decolonization, and International law in Post-
World War II South Asia,” Law and History Review 38, no. 1 (2020): 1-24; Darinee Alagirisamy, “The Self-
Respect Movement and Tamil Politics of Belonging in Interwar British Malaya, 1929-1939,” Modern Asian 
Studies 50, no. 5 (2016): 1547–1575; Sunil Amrith, Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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experience of home, identity, and culture.3 Scholars have provided a more refined 
understanding of diasporas’ relation to homeland and their political imaginary, as well as of 
diasporas’ roles in the production of new ideas of nationhood, race, solidarity, and belonging.4  
Several of these historians conclude their works by tracing the ways in which the coming of 
independence in South and Southeast Asia abruptly terminated the circular migrations of the 
age of empire. This process, as Amrith has shown, ‘immobilized people that had once been 
mobile’.5 Relying on the public speeches of the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, these 
historians regard the end of the circulation of people as the end of the Government of India’s 
involvement with the Diaspora. The research below, however, demonstrates that the political 
and social networks and the ‘imaginative worlds’6 that were fundamental to the experience of 
Diaspora did not disappear once the circular migrations of the age of empire had been halted. 
At the same time, historians of the Indian diaspora have shown that independence was also the 
culmination of a longer process of the minoritisation of Indians in Burma, Ceylon and 
elsewhere.7 In the pages that follow, we show that this very process of minoritisation was not 
 
3 See for instance Gaiutra Bahdur, Coolie Woman: The Odyssey of Indenture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2014); Marina Carter and Torabully Khal, Coolitude: An Anthology of the Indian Labour Diaspora 
(London: Anthem Press, 2002). 
4 Ned Bertz, Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in 
Tanzania (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2015); Sana Aiyar, Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora 
(Cambridge, Mass.: London: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
5 Amrith, Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia, 120.   
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Rajashree Mazumder, “Constructing the Indian immigrant to colonial Burma, 1885-1948” (PhD diss., UCLA, 
2013), chap. 5; Hugh Tinker, Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth 1920-
1950 (London: Hurst & Company, 1976); Tinker, The Banyan Tree: Overseas emigrants from India, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). On minoritisation, Aamir R. Mufti, 
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simply foisted upon Indians overseas against their will, but was itself the product of a 
transnational and multi-scalar negotiation, albeit one conducted on the basis of a highly unequal 
balance of power between the parties. This negotiation mobilised some of the same networks 
and imaginaries of earlier eras.  
From the Indian side of the scholarship, these overseas Indians have been integrated into 
histories of nationalism and imperialism in the period before 1947. Scholars have uncovered 
the ways in which the imperial Government of India was called upon to protect the interests 
and develop a regime of rights for Indians overseas.8 In parallel, the diaspora played an 
important role in the development of Indian nationalism and helped foster a certain extra-
territorial understanding of India.9 Aware of the difficult working conditions and 
discrimination overseas Indians faced, India’s nationalists called for reports on their conditions 
and, in the 1920s, for these workers to return ‘home’ to India.10  
 
Enlightenment in the Colony: the Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007) 
8 Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010); Rachel Sturman, “Indian Indentured Labor and the History of International Rights 
Regimes,” The American Historical Review 19, no. 5 (2014): 1439-1465. 
9 Faisal Devji, The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence (London: Hurst & Company, 
2012); Ramachandra Guha, Gandhi before India (New York: Knopf, 2014). On anticolonial diasporic networks, 
see Maia Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Chartered Global Radicalism and Attempted to 
Overthrow the British Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Nico Slate, Colored 
Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
10 John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan, “Diaspora and Swaraj, Swaraj and Diaspora,” in From the Colonial to the 
Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, eds. Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 311-331.  
 5 
In 1947, it was estimated that almost 3.5 million Indians lived outside the subcontinent. The 
majority of these overseas Indians lived in Burma, Ceylon and Malaya.11 There were 500,000 
Indians in Burma and 900,000 in Ceylon, including 750,000 mostly Dalit labourers who 
worked on tea plantations on the island.12 Independent India, therefore, inherited a double 
nationalist and colonial legacy of responsibility for overseas Indians. Concurring with the 
scholarship on the Diaspora, historians of India have mostly agreed that India quickly abjured 
this responsibility after independence.  
There are several versions of this argument. One claims that with independence India’s new 
government adhered to a territorially-based understanding of sovereignty and citizenship. India 
moved to a territorial nationality, which required ‘publicly distancing itself from its long-
standing concerns for the condition of its diaspora.’13 This meant that overseas Indians had 
‘given up their rights of protection from the Indians state.’14 Some authors described a 
‘dramatic shift in the Congress party’s policy’, which moved from being ‘very concerned with 
the fate of the expatriate Indians’ to ignoring them from 1947 onwards.15 A second, more 
nuanced, assessment notes the fact that overseas Indians remained in place, and records their 
struggles to acquire citizenship, but minimises the role of the Government of India in 
 
11 C. Kondapi, “Indians overseas,” India Quarterly I, no. 1 (January 1945), 71. 
12 Confidential, “Ceylon – Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform,” proof version, Colonial 
Office, London, 1945. Enclosed in Secret, George H. Hall, “Ceylon Constitution: Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies,” Cabinet Memorandum, 31 August 1945, CAB 129/1/38, UK National Archives 
(henceforth: UKNA), 39. 
13 Itty Abraham, How India became territorial: Foreign policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 69-70.  
14 Ibid., 98.  
15 Marie-Carine Lall, India’s Missed Opportunity: India’s relationship with the Non-Resident Indians 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 1 and 5.   
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determining their fate. Latha Varadarajan, for example, has argued that ‘[r]ather than 
embracing the cause of the Indians abroad …the new leadership instead offered a critique of 
their comportment in their states of residence, while upholding the sovereign political and 
economic rights of those states.’16 A third version of the story argues that India remained 
concerned for overseas Indians, but transferred responsibility for their protection to the United 
Nations (UN).17 
Examining relations between the Government of India and overseas Indians in Ceylon and 
Burma in the two decades after independence, this article demonstrates that India neither 
renounced its responsibility for overseas Indians at independence nor handed it over to the UN. 
To be sure, representatives of the Government of India, especially the Prime Minister, publicly 
reiterated the new country’s commitment to a form of ‘hard’ sovereignty that would seem to 
preclude any action on behalf of overseas Indians. Beyond the level of official rhetoric, 
however, there were constant demands for the Government of India to act to assist overseas 
Indians, and it often did so. The Indian Government worked to help Indians in Burma and 
Ceylon negotiate claims for citizenship in those countries. It also shaped the institutions and 
language through which Indians in these countries articulated demands for their rights, whether 
these were claims for citizenship, representation or economic welfare.  
Uncovering the continued engagement of the Indian Government with overseas Indians 
enables us to make two arguments. The first argument concerns sovereignty, and begins with 
 
16 Ibid., 76-77; Sunil Amrith, “Struggles for Citizenship around the Bay of Bengal,” in The Postcolonial 
Moment in South and Southeast Asia, eds. Gyan Prakash, Michael Laffan and Nikhil Menon (London: 
Bloomsbury Press, 2018), 107-120; Raman, “The Postwar ‘Returnee’”, 121-140; Deborah Sutton, “Divided and 
Uncertain Loyalties: Partition, Indian Sovereignty and Contested Citizenship in East Africa, 1948-1955,” 
Interventions 9, no. 2 (2007): 76-288.  
17 Manu Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2012). 
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a methodological intervention. Representatives of the Government of India never spoke 
explicitly about sovereignty. Consequently, scholars have been left to infer how India 
understood this concept. Because access to the records of the Ministry of External Affairs has 
long been restricted, scholars have tended to make these inferences based on the public 
pronouncements of Jawaharlal Nehru, who, as Prime Minister and Minister for External 
Affairs, directed Indian foreign policy. It is obvious, however, that no state’s foreign policy 
can be understood solely through the public statements of one leader. For that reason, in this 
article we explore the issue through what we call practices of sovereignty. Focusing on practice 
as an expression of sovereignty allows us to examine what official representatives of the 
government of India at various levels and in different locations were doing.18  
The second facet of this argument concerns the unitary nature of sovereignty. The existing 
literature on sovereignty in India tends to support the hypothesis of a move towards a 
Westphalian-type of sovereignty with independence in 1947, even as the idea of Westphalian 
sovereignty has been subjected to revision.19 Studies focused on the nature of India’s 
conception of sovereignty can be seen as divided between two camps. One camp argues that 
India did, at least largely, conform to a model of what has until recently been understood 
without complications as the Westphalian nation-state.20 The other camp argues that India’s 
 
18 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1-36. 
19 Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International 
Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251-287.  
20 Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva and Neo- liberal,” 
in Order and Justice in International Relation, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 236; Srinath Raghavan, “The United Nations and the Emergence of 
Independent India,” in Charter of the United Nations: Together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential 
Historical Documents, eds. Ian Shapiro and Joseph Lampert (Yale University Press, 2014), 152. 
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postcolonial sovereignty was more complex because of its multilateral engagement.21 Both of 
these camps tend to regard sovereignty as existing on a single plane, whether singular or shared.  
The starting point for our study of postcolonial India is the fact that imperial sovereignty was 
layered. Under the British Empire, sovereignty had been shared across multiple tiers of 
authority, from the imperial centre in London, to the capital in New Delhi and princely states. 
Independent India not only inherited these layered practices of sovereignty, it reproduced them. 
While the government may have publicly expressed adherence to a unitary and territorialised 
form of sovereignty, it simultaneously faced pressures that pulled it in the opposite direction. 
Those forces tended to derive from pre-existing connections either above or below the nation-
state level, connections forged during India’s time in Britain’s imperial system.  
Because independent India inherited a set of responsibilities and concerns which existed 
across multiple layers of sub-national, national and international politics, this article uses the 
term post-imperial sovereignty to characterise India’s complex expressions of sovereignty. In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the shift from a world of competing imperialisms to 
one of nation-states was not straightforward. The international system and its constituent parts 
are in a constant state of becoming, and the period between the 1940s and the 1960s witnessed 
a ‘process of struggle between entrenched formations and new forces’.22 The very notion of 
India was born into this struggle: its borders were ill-defined; its responsibilities spread across 
 
21 Manu Bhagavan, “A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,” Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (2010): 311-347; Priya Chacko, “The internationalist nationalist: 
pursuing an ethical modernity with Jawaharlal Nehru,” in International Relations and Non-western Thought: 
Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, ed. Robbie Shilliam (Oxford; New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 181. 
22 Itty Abraham, “Prolegomena to Non- alignment,” in The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - 
Bandung - Belgrade, eds. Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boskovska (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2014), 82. 
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far-flung spaces; it was unusually concerned with people. India grappled with these post-
imperial problems by working to usher in a new international order. As Indian government 
representatives, state governments, ambassadors and high commissioners, as well as ordinary 
Indians (overseas and at home) negotiated this amorphous and changing world, they articulated 
conceptions of responsibility and expressions of sovereignty that extended beyond the 
territorialised nation-state.  
Because expressions of sovereignty were not restricted to the space of the nation-state, this 
had repercussions for practices of citizenship, which brings us to our second argument. 
Scholarship on citizenship has moved beyond the idea that it is best understood as a legal 
regime. Instead, citizenship is now regarded as both a set of laws defining citizens’ rights, as 
well as a set of practices through which citizens make use of those rights. Focusing on partition 
and its aftermath, this literature in South Asia has traced the struggles partition refugees faced 
as they sought recognition as legal citizens, and as they endeavored to exercise their substantive 
citizenship.23 The pages that follow deal with a little-studied aspect of citizenship: the 
complicated route to de-recognition.24 Before 1947, there was a mutual recognition of the 
 
23 e.g. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), chap.3; Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of 
Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Joya 
Chatterji, Partition’s Legacies (Albany: SUNY Press, 2021); Uditi Sen, Citizen Refugee: Forging the Indian 
Nation after Partition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Anjali Bhardwaj Datta, “‘Useful’ and 
‘Earning’ Citizens: Gender, State and the Market in Post-colonial Delhi,” Modern Asian Studies 53, no. 6 (2019): 
1924-1955; William Gould and Sarah Ansari, Boundaries of Belonging: Localities, Citizenship and Rights in 
India and Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).  
24 Dina Gusejnova, “Changes of Status in States of Political Uncertainty: Towards A Theory of Derecognition,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 22, no. 2 (2018): 1-18. 
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responsibility that existed between the Government of India and overseas Indians.25 After 1947, 
the official position was that Indians overseas who chose to adopt the citizenship of their 
country of residence would no longer be India’s responsibility, while those who remained 
Indian citizens could only be temporary residents elsewhere. Two problems arose from this 
attempted pivot. Firstly, there was the problem of sorting Indian citizens from non-citizens, a 
process that was not fully worked out during two decades of negotiations. Secondly, there was 
the fact of existing ties of recognition between the Government of India and all overseas 
Indians, regardless of citizenship. It is argued below that there remained mutual recognition of 
responsibility between the Government of India and overseas Indians in Ceylon and Burma. 
This recognition saw the Government of India build institutions in Ceylon and Burma, and 
shape the ways in which people of Indian origin articulated their claims for rights in these 
countries.   
As it negotiated a changing regime of both sovereignty and citizenship, the Indian 
Government also tried to shape the international norms and rules that would govern the 
emerging international order. In so doing it articulated universal principles, which 
simultaneously served India’s interests. This was absolutely in accord with the common 
practice of the time. After all the Anglo-American system that emerged after the Second World 
War was cast in the same mould. India sought to instill three norms as it worked through the 
problem of overseas Indians: first, that the future of non-citizen minorities like overseas Indians 
ought to be settled through negotiation between states, rather than unilaterally by one of them; 
second, that the will of the people concerned ought to be paramount, so that people would not 
be forced to move if they did not wish to; third, that any laws or rules which applied to non-
citizen minorities ought to be non-discriminatory. Moving away from the details of any 
 
25 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: the Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996).  
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particular situation, the Government of India tried to elaborate principles that could be 
universally applied in a way that would serve the interests of Indian communities overseas. 
India sought to shape international norms by elaborating universal principles.  
India’s policy towards Indians in Burma and Ceylon can be seen as part of India’s larger 
effort to help overseas Indians fight discrimination after independence. The strategy India 
adopted as it argued for rights on behalf of overseas Indians was simultaneously multilateral 
and bilateral. It sought to use international fora to solve their problems on a larger scale. 
Bhagavan’s work on India’s case against South Africa at the UN reminds us that India’s foreign 
policy was concerned with the fight against discrimination at the international level. Far from 
forgetting this long-lasting issue, the Indian Government took the lead to address it at the UN 
as early as 1946. It did not, however, uniformly move the issue to the UN for all states. India 
also sought to use the Commonwealth and the 1947 Asian Relations Conference (ARC) to raise 
the same problem. Regionally, India attempted to negotiate a solution within an all-Asian 
regional framework and bilaterally with Ceylon and Burma.  
Even as it pursued ambitious multilateral plans, India maintained localised practical efforts 
at the regional level. Here, the effects of pressure from below were in evidence. Because the 
diaspora in Ceylon and Burma retained strong links to India via regular returns, marriages and 
remittances, there was a constituency within India, particularly in Madras, which could convey 
information about what was happening in Ceylon and Burma to New Delhi and call on the 
central government to act. The Government of India tended to pick up the case only when it 
could fit the demands within the norms that it was articulating concerning the will of the people 
and non-discrimination.  
Research for this article cobbles together materials from the UK National Archives, the 
British Library, the National Archives of India, as well as published sources and digitized 
newspapers. The nature of the official archive for the period after independence in India is such 
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that this is necessarily an incomplete and ad hoc archive. Our collection of resources has its 
limitations: access to archives related to Myanmar is not easy; as our own linguistic 
competencies do not extend to Tamil, we have been unable to explore Tamil sources, or the 
rich linkages of Tamil politics that are only hinted at in the pages below.26   
This article is divided into four sections. The first section situates the question of overseas 
Indians within its pre-independence context. The second section examines the post-imperial 
transition. The third section analyses how India attempted to find a multilateral solution in 
different fora – the UN, the Commonwealth, and the ARC. The last section charts how India 
worked to secure access to citizenship for overseas Indians and to negotiate better conditions 
for Indians in Ceylon and Burma.  In the conclusion we offer some thoughts on whether the 
patterns set in relations with these two close neighbours were repeated for Overseas Indians 
farther afield.  
 
The decade before independence 
 
In the nineteenth century Indians began to move across the British empire in large numbers as 
indentured labourers. The Government of India was instrumental in developing this system and 
was compelled to take cognizance of the welfare of these labourers in their destination 
countries. Officials took an interest in questions of ‘transport, conditions of service in the 
countries of immigration, repatriation, and permanent settlement’.27 The Government of India 
 
26 Raman, “The Postwar ‘Returnee’”, 121-140; Alagirisamy, “The Self-Respect Movement and Tamil Politics 
of Belonging in Interwar British Malaya, 1929–1939,” 1547-1575; Ramnath, “Intertwined Itineraries,” 1-24. 
27 P. Kodanda Rao, “Indians overseas,” The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
233, no. 1 (1944): 204. 
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not only facilitated migration but also regulated it.28 Indentured labour was abolished in 1917, 
but the Government remained attentive in the question of overseas Indians’ welfare, not least 
because by this time India’s nationalists had taken up the issue. The Government appointed 
agents in Ceylon, Malaya, Burma and South Africa. The role of that agent was ‘to see that the 
conditions under which Emigration was permitted were carried out’ and to make suggestions 
on legislation affecting Indian labour.29 At home, after Indians were granted significant 
legislative powers with the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, an Indian Emigration Act was 
passed in 1922. That Act included an assurance that Indians would be treated on an equal 
footing with other British subjects elsewhere.  
The Government of India’s moves to protect overseas Indians from discrimination came at 
a time when pressure against overseas Indians was gaining force. As South Africa continued 
to pass discriminatory laws against Indians, India’s representatives tried to directly negotiate 
with it at a roundtable conference in Cape Town in 1926-27.30 While Ceylon’s constitutions in 
the 1920s had granted equal rights to Indians, the Constitution of 1931 marked the beginning 
 
28 Radhika Mongia, “Historicizing State Sovereignty: Inequality and the form of equivalence,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 49, no. 2 (2007): 384-411. 
29 A. V. Pai to D. V. Rege, Department of Commonwealth Relations (CR), New Delhi, 13 October 1945. In 
“Indian Labour working in Ceylon, Malaya etc.---Enquiry by labour investigation committee regarding protective 
measures taken for the benefit of labourers at the instance of the Govt. of India”, CR Dept., Overseas II, File No. 
125(5)-O.S., 1946, NAI. 
30 These efforts led to the 1927 Cape Town Agreement, according to which India accepted to assist voluntary 
emigration of Indians in South Africa, while South Africa promised to take measures that were to uplift the Indian 
community remaining on its territory.  
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of a process of rolling back Indian rights.31 Reforms abolished communal electorates (meant 
to ensure the protection of minorities) and extended universal adult franchise but with literacy, 
property, and residence qualifications. These changes resulted in decreasing the representation 
in the legislature and restricting the vote of a large portion of people of Indian origin on the 
island.32 As the effects of the Great Depression tore through Ceylon’s economy, many began 
to argue that removing Indians would provide much needed economic relief for the small 
island’s unemployment problem. At the end of the 1930s Ceylon attempted to completely ban 
Indian unskilled labour from immigrating to the country. It also sought to retrench thousands 
of Indian labourers in government service in Ceylon and send them home, thereby significantly 
reducing the size of the island’s Indian population.33 The Government of India, taking umbrage 
at these unilateral measures, negotiated, ultimately unsuccessfully, with the government in 
Colombo across multiple conferences in the late 1930s and early 1940s.  
During these meetings, India articulated a universalist norm against discrimination. Sir G.S. 
Bajpai,34 a frequent member of delegations to conferences on overseas Indians since the 1920s, 
summed up the Indian Government’s position, which was that after a certain period of time 
resident in another territory of the British Empire, Indians ‘acquire equality with the indigenous 
 
31 S. K. Agrawala and M. Koteswara Rao, “Nationality and international law in Indian perspective,” in 
Nationality and International Law in Asian Perspective, ed. Ko Swam Sik (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1990), 108.  
32 Amita Shastri, “Estate Tamils, the Ceylon citizenship act of 1948 and Sri Lankan politics,” Contemporary 
South Asia 8, no. 1 (1999): 69-71; T.S. Rajagopalan, “Indians Overseas: The position in Ceylon,” India Quarterly 
1, no. 2 (1945): 169-171. 
33 Times of India, 12 February 1941, p. 7. 
34 Girja Shankar Bajpai (1891-1954), a former Indian civil servant during the Raj, was then Secretary-General 
of the Ministry of External Affairs. 
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inhabitants of the territory’.35 Even as they negotiated with Ceylon, the Government of India 
remained mindful that any agreement with one territory could have repercussions in others. 
Bajpai noted that if the Government of India conceded any limitations on Indians obtaining full 
citizenship rights in Ceylon, ‘we open the door to similar claims all over the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.’36  
In Burma the response to the economic crises of the 1930s was similar.37 In contrast with the 
Ceylon case, however, the Government of India did reach an agreement with Burma to restrict 
Indian immigration there. While Ceylon had taken unilateral action, the Government of Burma 
invited India to bilateral talks on the question, which opened in the monsoon season of 1941. 
Burma’s delegation to the talks was led by the Premier, U Saw, who was careful to note that 
Indian landowners and labourers had been welcomed when the population of the country had 
been scant. During the Depression, however, a class of Burmans had emerged who neither 
owned land nor were able to find employment ‘owing to competition from non-Burman 
labour’.38 Riots between Indians and Burmans in 1938 added a sense of urgency to the way the 
presence of Indians in Burma was problematised. In 1941 the two governments agreed to 
‘regulate and restrict’ Indian immigration to Burma, with a system of passports, visas for 
temporary entry, and permits for employment and longer residence.39  
Although the war ensured the pact was never implemented,40 negotiations over the accord 
provided an opportunity for the two to agree what the governments called ‘principles’ 
 
35 Times of India, 12 February 1941, 7. 
36 Times of India, 12 February 1941, 7. 
37 Mazumder, “Constructing the Indian Immigrant”. 
38 Times of India, 19 June 1941, 7. 
39 Times of India, 22 July 1941, 7. 
40 Times of India, 29 July 1941, p.9, 20 January 1942, 5.  
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underlying their discussions on overseas Indians. The first was that the Government of Burma 
had ‘the right to determine the composition of [its] own population.’ The second was that, 
‘Indians who have wholly identified themselves with the interests of Burma should enjoy the 
same rights as members of the permanent population.’41 One might add a third principle, which 
can be inferred from the practice of negotiation: the norm that these decisions ought to be made 
in consultation, rather than unilaterally.    
In parallel, the Indian National Congress deepened its links with the diaspora, first in Ceylon 
and then in Burma.42 In July 1939, as Ceylon announced a raft of measures against Indians, 
Jawaharlal Nehru travelled across the Palk Straight on a good-will mission. Nehru, who was 
described as an ‘ambassador’ by the press, tried to persuade the Government of Ceylon that 
‘there should always be full consultation with each other before any action was taken’ which 
might affect Indians.43 Although he was unable to tie together a solution to the complex 
problem of Indian labour during his brief visit, he did succeed in persuading Indian leaders in 
Ceylon to form a single political body to represent their interests. Nehru was said to have 
drafted the Constitution of the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC), according to which, it was 
reported, the new party ‘will have more or less the same ideals as the Indian National 
Congress.’44 
The transition to a new nationalist-led interim government in September 1946 did not put an 
end to the pre-independence concern that the INC and its leaders had publicly manifested for 
Indians abroad, nor did it sever the links with the CIC. In November 1946, Nehru evoked 
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specific measures for India to stay in contact with overseas Indians and check their condition.45 
At the legislative assembly in 1947, he mentioned again that the government wished to send 
‘missions to keep in touch with our people there, bring us data and help in establishing closer 
relations with them’.46  
While the CIC had been founded nearly a decade before independence, the All-Burma Indian 
Conference (later Congress) was established in December 1947, barely a week before Burma 
celebrated its independence. B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Advisor to the Government of India, 
opened the conference in Rangoon.47 In terms of both rhetoric and institutions, the independent 
Government of India was not so much abjuring responsibility for these overseas Indians, as 
setting relations on a new footing. 
 
The post-imperial transition: Overseas Indians and citizenship 
 
During the colonial period, the Government of India and the Indian National Congress had 
recognised overseas Indians as a constituency which could legitimately claim their attention 
and support. They had also elaborated principles and founded institutions for the exercise of 
this responsibility. This recognition had been reciprocated, as overseas Indians looked to 
institutions, politicians and governments back in India to help them define and defend their 
interests in Burma and Ceylon. So long as India was part of the British Empire, Indians of all 
stripes could appeal to the higher imperial authorities to help them exercise influence over 
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Burma and Ceylon. Indeed, in the final decade of imperial rule, Britain appointed various 
commissions and investigations to try to propose a solution to what was called the problem of 
overseas Indians in Burma and Ceylon.48 Moreover, as long as Indians were British subjects 
they possessed what Nehru called, ‘a kind of dual nationality’49 which prevented them from 
being rendered stateless by the actions of another colonial territory.  
The British declaration in 1947 that they would be departing from their South Asian empire 
removed a layer of sovereign authority from the equation. It also began a transition to national 
regimes of citizenship, outside of the umbrella of British subjecthood. The ‘kind of dual 
nationality’ that had prevailed under the British Empire had not required the rigid demarcation 
between Indian citizens and non-citizens, nor, for most who travelled, did it necessitate 
passports. The new regime would require both. In this new context, overseas Indians could be 
vulnerable to unilateral expulsion, or subject to discriminatory legislation. Indeed, Burma and 
Ceylon both moved in this direction in the late 1940s.     
Historians studying these new national regimes of citizenship have tended to argue that India 
adopted a territorialised and restricted form of citizenship.50 However, if citizenship is 
understood as a form of recognition and a set of practices, then the Government of India’s 
official position on overseas Indians was more complex than previous scholars have 
acknowledged. Because dual citizenship was not ever seriously countenanced in post-imperial 
South Asia, the Government of India had to begin to try to parse citizens from non-citizens. 
Those who claimed Indian citizenship, would have to obtain Indian passports, and would have 
their ability to travel and work outside of India curtailed. For those who wished to stay where 
they had migrated, the Government of India’s official position was ‘Indian settlers abroad 
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should identify themselves, as far as possible, with the interests of the nationals of the country 
of their adoption and really become part and parcel of its national life’ so as to be able to claim 
citizenship of their adopted country. For India, it followed that Indian settlers ‘should not suffer 
from racial inequality’ and so should be granted citizenship or rights equal to citizens in their 
adopted countries.51  
There were several ways in which the task of demarcating citizens from aliens was 
complicated. Firstly, Indian representatives repeatedly visited overseas Indians and urged them 
to act as ‘ambassadors’ for India, blurring the simple division of this population into citizens 
and aliens.52 As late as 1959, the President of India, Rajendra Prasad, visited Ceylon, and 
addressed a gathering of Indians there. Using the term ambassador to describe Indians living 
in Ceylon, Prasad told his audience, ‘I request you to do this – nay, as President of India, I 
order you to do your best to help the country you live in. It is in this way you will help 
yourselves and your motherland best.’53 In a world with unitary understandings of sovereignty 
and citizenship, the statement is nonsensical. But the President’s order makes sense as an 
expression of a layered understanding of sovereignty. In this conception, loyalty could be 
demanded and professed at several levels and across multiple spaces.   
Secondly, separating citizens from others was complicated by pressure from below in India. 
Many Indians viewed the treatment of Indians in Burma, Ceylon or South Africa with dismay, 
and demanded their Government act, regardless of their legal status. As one letter to the Times 
of India put it, ‘If Indians are illtreated because they are Indians, then we must protect them 
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because they are Indians’.54 In some ways this was merely a continuation of the recognition 
that had been established during the colonial period. That the Government of India felt 
compelled to conduct its foreign policy with a mind to respecting these demands is evidence 
of the importance of sub-national actors in Indian foreign relations in this layered practice of 
sovereignty.   
Thirdly, and most importantly, Indians Overseas simply refused to sort themselves into 
discrete groups by making a declaration of nationality. This problem was recognised even 
before Indian independence. In 1946, the civil servant R.N. Banerjee wrote to R.T. Chari, the 
Secretary to the Representative of the Government of India in Ceylon that they both knew that 
‘a very large number of Indians would not be prepared to make any such declaration’.55 The 
same was true in Burma. Even among those who did choose to take up another nationality, 
these countries did not always accept their claim. While India was happy to take responsibility 
for its citizens and renounce it for those who took up a different nationality, there was an 
enormous group of people who fit neither category, but with whom India had historic ties of 
recognition and responsibility. The problem of overseas Indians at independence, therefore, 
entailed sorting those with Indian nationality from those without it, and also ensuring that those 
overseas Indians who wished to claim rights in other countries, including the right to citizenship 
and nationality, were not discriminated against.  
 
Negotiating multilateral citizenship 
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Around the time of independence, India attempted to craft a multilateral solution to the problem 
of overseas Indians. To a certain extent, this was in line with pre-independence approaches of 
both the colonial Government of India and of anti-colonial leaders, who ensured that 
negotiations on overseas Indians in different countries tended to be treated as a single topic in 
imperial conferences. In the 1920s, Indian nationalists had also leveraged ideas of imperial 
citizenship and used early international organizations to promote protections for overseas 
Indians.56 In 1946, India’s interim government retained a similarly global perspective. One key 
difference with pre-independence times, however, was that the postwar/decolonisation moment 
opened a new window of opportunity to shape and promote a new order through international 
norms – a possibility India was keenly aware of.57 This global possibility paralleled and 
intersected with the development of a postcolonial legal order through national constitution-
making.58 The Indian Government made several attempts to forge a consensus on new norms 
that would have ensured equality of treatment for overseas Indians. Its representatives 
promoted common and general principles and mechanisms on minorities, individuals’ and 
citizens’ rights that they hoped would be agreed on and recognised at the UN (1946), the 
Commonwealth (1947-49), and the Asian Relations Conference (1947).  
At the UN, as is well-known, India was the first state to refer a case against another UN 
member to challenge its discriminatory policies. In June 1946, it requested that the Agenda of 
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the General Assembly include the treatment of Indians in South Africa.59 Its case challenged 
Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, since Indians were nationals of South Africa, by arguing that the 
treatment of Indians was not a domestic issue, but an international one. Subsequently, in 1947-
8, India promoted a strong UN human rights regime, again partly to protect overseas Indians 
against discrimination through the UN system. Hansa Mehta, India’s delegate to the Human 
Rights Commission, promoted ambitious proposals to implement and enforce human rights, 
for the binding character of these rights, and for a right of petition by individuals and 
organisations, which would have enabled overseas Indians to defend themselves through the 
UN.60  
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The Asian Relations Conference of March-April 1947 gave India another opportunity to try 
to craft a multilateral solution to the problem of overseas Indians. This conference is usually 
depicted as an early Indian initiative to boost Asia’s and India’s international standing after the 
Second World War. It has been seen as the ‘inaugural act of [the] vision’ of Nehru’s foreign 
policy and the origin of the ‘Third World’.61 Nehru introduced the conference by reflecting on 
internationalism and on how to reconnect the people of Asia after the isolation of colonialism.62 
For all the symbolism of this gathering, the topics discussed in groups addressed very concrete 
issues shared by Asian neighbours.63  
Thus, the group on Racial Problems and Inter-Asian Migration discussed issues pertaining 
directly to overseas Indians. As a contemporary commentator noted, its discussion topic was 
‘of absorbing interest’ to delegates since ‘[e]verywhere in the East [were] great settlements of 
immigrants – Indians in Ceylon, Indians and Chinese in Burma and Malaya, Chinese in Siam, 
Indians and Chinese in Indo-China, Chinese in Indonesia.’64 The conference is often presented 
as the moment when a new Asian order took shape along strict territorial national lines in 
opposition to a past fluidity of belonging and movement. It is usually emphasised that delegates 
agreed that states had the right to determine their population and limit immigration. It has been 
argued that this Group’s discussion therefore illustrated their ‘acceptance of the nation-state 
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model’ – proving that India ‘[reterritorialized] itself unambiguously’ and broke from a more 
expansive and less territorial notion of itself.65  
Yet, proceedings show that the fight against discrimination of minorities abroad was a central 
part of that discussion. The conversation was led by Indian delegates. At the Round Table, 
speaking first,66 they developed the idea of an inclusive and non-discriminatory framework for 
minorities in Asia. Unlike what India had done at the UN in 1946, they framed the question as 
an inter-state issue.67 Thus, K.M. Panikkar, Indian delegate and Vice-Chairman of the Group, 
adopted a ‘very legalistic and theoretical view of the problem of immigrants’, which he called 
“non-citizen groups”.68 After asserting a state’s right to ‘determine the future composition of 
its nationhood’, another Indian delegate formulated India’s second proposition: non-citizen 
groups should be equal before the law even though they would not be able to claim political 
rights in the country in which they lived.69 In this argumentation, these two principles went 
necessarily hand-in-hand. More specifically, Indian delegates enunciated three criteria by 
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which to judge a government’s ‘dealings with races’: equality before the law, religious equality 
and the absence of public social discrimination.70 As the Group moved on to debate ‘ways and 
means to eliminate racial conflicts and promote understanding,’ 71 they sought to forge a 
consensus on these principles by making ‘concrete suggestions’:  
 
First, discriminatory legislation should as far as possible be prevented. Secondly, the non-
citizen permanent alien groups which have so far cropped up as a direct result of British 
imperialism should be eliminated from the countries where they are numerous by offering 
citizenship rights to them or treating them as aliens come there on temporary business. 
Thirdly, political parties should be non-racial and non-communal in composition and 
should be based purely on economic principles. Fourthly, all countries should take steps to 
assimilate the non-indigenous groups in them.72 
 
Those principles constituted India’s proposal for an all-Asian framework that it hoped would 
solve the problem of overseas Indians. Significantly, Burmese and Indian delegates stressed 
that aliens should be assimilated ‘in due course of time because permanent aliens would 
continue to be under the diplomatic protection of their mother country.’73 They seemed to put 
the onus on the states, rather than on communities, by arguing that the ‘home’ state kept a 
responsibility towards these overseas populations.  
The summary of the discussion took on board India’s suggestion that countries had an 
‘absolute right to limit immigration, but this limitation should be based on the principle of non-
discrimination’ – at least among Asians.74 The principles ‘which should govern the relations 
of different racial groups in all Asian countries’ corresponded to what Indians had proposed at 
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the beginning of the discussion.75 An internal Indian report acknowledged that.76 It highlighted 
that there was ‘consensus of opinion that – (i) the total assimilation of the present non-citizen 
groups within the citizenship of the country of sojourn is desirable  and should be expedited; 
and  (ii) for the future each country should be free to frame its own immigration laws as it liked, 
subject only to the consideration that they should be reasonable and non-discriminatory’.77 
This Indian activism at the ARC reveals how India strived to reshape the concept of citizenship 
after independence.     
However, the proposal faced resistance from Ceylon. Just as a newspaper noticed that ‘the 
principles and views enunciated there go to the roots of Indo-Ceylon relations,’78 so did 
Ceylonese delegates. Accordingly, the left-leaning Sinhalese leader and future Prime Minister, 
Solomon Bandaranaike, reacted negatively and proved to be the ‘only strong dissenter’ from 
the Indian view. He argued that ‘the entire non-citizen group now existing in Ceylon could or 
should be absorbed.’79 He further accused the Tamil members of his delegation of ‘speaking 
against his own and his Government’s majority view’.80 Ceylonese Tamils (and Indian 
Burmans) were part of the Burma and Ceylon delegations. Apparently providing proof positive 
of Sinhala fears about the loyalty of Indian Tamils, during the discussion of the report, one 
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Indian Tamil delegate for Ceylon, Mr. Naganathan, voiced his agreement with India’s 
position.81 Bandaranaike sought to defeat India’s proposal on procedural grounds: he argued 
that, the Conference being informal, ‘it would not be proper to lay down that the opinions 
expressed in the Group reports should be followed up by measures to give effect to them.’ The 
Conference was not meant to ‘go into the internal affairs of any country’ and ‘call upon 
governments of participating countries to give effect to its conclusions.’82  
Bandaranaike’s procedural remarks set off an argument over the purpose of the conference 
and the future of the conclusions its delegates would come to. Interestingly, the Indian 
delegation proved to be divided on this point. On one side, Leilamani Naidu and Vijaya 
Lakshmi Pandit advocated a stronger form of action.83 Pandit, Nehru’s sister, argued that ‘the 
purpose of the Conference would be defeated if a specific recommendation were not made to 
all governments to act in accordance with the principles accepted by the Conference’.84 On the 
other side, two delegates linked to the Indian Council of World Affairs, the organising body of 
the ARC, informed Pandit that her position was not sustainable.85 She insisted, however, 
connecting the discussions at the ARC to the resolution she had spearheaded in the 1946 the 
UN General Assembly against South Africa’s racial discrimination: ‘Would it not be 
anomalous […] if we talked loudly on race in the United Nations without being able to 
recommend measures to Governments in our own Asian Conference?’86 However, 
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Bandaranaike opposed this interpretation and he prevailed. The Plenary Session adopted the 
Rapporteur’s report, in which common principles for citizenship across Asia were absent.  
On a third multilateral front, the Indian government sought to protect overseas Indians 
against racial discrimination through its negotiations with the Commonwealth. Between 1947 
and 1949, republican India strived to negotiate a common Commonwealth citizenship as a basis 
of its new relation to the Commonwealth.87 This conception of citizenship would have allowed 
Indians to benefit from reciprocal rights within the Commonwealth, which theoretically would 
have ended their discrimination in the Dominions.   
Thus, according to Alan Campbell-Johnson,88 Nehru first suggested ‘an Anglo-Indian union 
involving nothing less than common citizenship’ when he met Lord Mountbatten, India’s last 
Viceroy, in March 1947.89 Subsequently, at the 1948 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, Nehru told the Ministers that his Government could consider ‘some link with the 
Commonwealth … on [the] basis of a Commonwealth nationality on reciprocal footing’, which 
would involve ‘dual nationality’.90 Along this line, Nehru wrote to British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee to propose a formula which specified, among other things, ‘In any fresh 
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legislation or treaties Commonwealth countries would not be treated as foreign states or their 
citizens as foreigners.’91  
A ‘Ten-Point Memorandum’ restated India’s proposals and described further what a 
common citizenship within the Commonwealth might mean for the Indian Government: first, 
‘[making] Indian nationals Commonwealth citizens, and the nationals of any Commonwealth 
country Commonwealth citizens when they are in India,’ on a reciprocal basis, through the UK 
Nationality Act. Second, India could ‘make use of any other Commonwealth country’s 
Ambassador or Minister’ in states where it had no representation, and this arrangement could 
be done on a reciprocal basis. Third, to ‘[fulfil] the obligations of the Crown towards 
Commonwealth citizens other than Indian nationals the President of the Indian Republic may 
at the request of the Crown act on behalf of the King within the territories of India’, and a 
‘similar arrangement on a reciprocal basis [would] apply to Indian nationals in the rest of the 
Commonwealth’.92 On the last point, Attlee understood that the King ‘would  act as the 
President’s representative for the protection of Indian citizens in the United Kingdom’ while 
‘where India maintained no separate diplomatic representation, the diplomatic protection of 
Indian citizens would be undertaken by the diplomatic representatives of other Commonwealth 
countries.’93 When G.S. Bajpai, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, 
discussed India’s proposals with Dominions’ representatives and Britain in November 1948, 
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he confirmed that, for Nehru, the King would be ‘the custodian of human rights.’94  Thus, 
without doubt, India envisioned the mechanism of a common citizenship to protect overseas 
Indians. Until the last moment of negotiation, at the 1949 Conference of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers, Nehru proposed that formula. At that point, India also accepted continued 
membership and the King as the symbol of the association of Commonwealth countries.95  
This proposal of citizenship would have been ‘something between nationality and the status 
of an alien.’96 As such, it represented both a re-actualisation of older Indian demands of 
imperial citizenship in the Empire and the attempt to radically reconfigure a postcolonial order 
along new normative lines, closer to Indian interests and the interests of its overseas 
communities. However, in the face of the Dominions’ opposition, India came to accept a 
Commonwealth membership without common citizenship.  
  
Representation, citizenship and property 
 
Even while proposing these ambitious multilateral imaginations of citizenship, the Government 
of India was also pressing for more modest solutions at the bi-lateral level. It did this as the 
relatively free circulations of people which had characterized the region in the colonial period 
were choked off: a permit system and then passports were introduced in states across South 
Asia in the late 1940s and early 1950s, requiring people to claim a nationality and then gain 
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permission to move across the new borders.97 Passports for travel to Ceylon were required from 
1949, and for Burma from 1950.98 In the case of both Burma and Ceylon, as they began to 
restrict the movement of people, and even tried to expel people of Indian origin, the 
Government of India remained engaged with the problems of overseas Indians in both countries 




One of the central problems concerning overseas Indians was legal citizenship, especially the 
process of guiding individuals who had had no need for passports or travel documents under 
the British empire, towards obtaining citizenship, passports and travel permits. Far from 
abjuring any responsibility for overseas Indians, the Government of India worked for decades 
to sort nationals from non-nationals, and also to help non-nationals secure their position in their 
host countries. This was a complex process that involved Indian officials in the lives of citizens, 
aliens and stateless persons.  
In the transition to independence, Burma and India seemed to seek mutually agreed solutions 
to the movement of people between the two countries. For its part, India had welcomed large 
numbers of evacuees from Burma (both Burmese and Indian) during the Second World War, 
and it took responsibility for restricting the movement of Indian evacuees back to Burma after 
the war had ended. To avoid exacerbating the unemployment problem in the country as it 
recovered, the Government of India undertook to ban Indian ‘evacuee unskilled labour’ from 
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returning to Burma in the aftermath of the war.99 Adhering to the ideal of consultation 
established during the war, in the early months of 1947 the Government of Burma had sent the 
Government of India a draft of an Emergency Immigration Bill for comment. However, in June 
1947, Burma’s newly formed Constituent Assembly passed an Emergency Immigration Act, 
which prohibited anyone except ‘a British subject domiciled in the United Kingdom’ from 
entering Burma without a visa or a permit.100 This act was ‘very different’ to the draft India 
had seen.101  
Soon after the Act was passed, sub-national groups in India began to raise a hue and cry 
about the provisions of the legislation in Burma. The President of the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Mr M.A. Master, said Burma’s immigration rules were 
‘a matter to be deeply deplored’, while the Honourable Secretary of the Rice Conference of 
India, Burma and Ceylon, Mahomed Husein Basham Premji, warned that new legislation 
would ‘cause serious misgivings’ regarding the future of relations between the two countries.102 
The following year, the Madras Assembly passed resolutions calling on Prime Minister Nehru 
to ‘use his influence’ to persuade the Government of Burma to amend the legislation.103  
In these early years, non-officials were not yet echoing the government of India’s language 
to make their case. Instead, there were simple appeals on behalf of Indian interests. M.A. 
Master alleged that the legislation ‘deprived Indians of their legitimate rights to proceed to 
Burma’, and worried it would deal a ‘severe blow to their interests’.104 Equally, the leader of 
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the Madras Legislative Assembly, P. Subbaroyan, spoke of the house’s ‘duty to safeguard their 
interests.’105 For its part, the Government of India protested, that, although it had ‘never 
questioned the right of the Government of Burma to enact legislation intended to restrict 
immigration into Burma’, such legislation ‘should be based on a bi-lateral agreement between 
the two countries…and that there should be no legislation in advance of such an agreement’.106 
The new citizenship regime in Burma required Indians to apply for citizenship, or to hold an 
Indian passport and obtain a permit to remain in Burma. Within a decade of Burma’s 
independence, an estimated 40,000 Indians had applied for Burmese citizenship.107 For those 
who were required to obtain a residence permit to remain in Burma, the All-Burma Indian 
Congress helped them make this application. However, the cost of this permit was raised to 50 
kyats per year in 1957.108 With a rough exchange rate of one Kyat to one Indian rupee, the price 
was prohibitively high for many of the poorer Indian labourers in Burma. Indeed, it emerged 
in 1959 that around 12,000 cultivators, descendants of a group who had migrated from Bihar 
in the late nineteenth century and resided in the Zeyawaddy Area of Taungoo District, were 
facing prosecution for failing to register for residence permits. India’s Ambassador to Burma, 
Lalji Mehrotra, visited the area, promised a house-to-house census, and took up the matter with 
the Government of Burma to ensure that these Biharis were not prosecuted for not having the 
proper paperwork to live in Burma.109 More than a decade after the independence of the two 
countries, we find Indian representatives travelling to Burma to help Indians comply with 
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Burma’s immigration laws. We witness here the continued practice of recognition and 
responsibility over Indians abroad.  
Although the legal provisions for citizenship in Burma and Ceylon were similar – both 
instituted jus sanguinis citizenship combined with the possibility of naturalisation by 
registration after a period of residence in the country – Ceylon pursued a much more aggressive 
policy against Indians in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During this period, Ceylon’s 
government pursued what it called ‘Ceylonisation’, working to oust Indians and Pakistanis 
from sectors one by one.110 As early as September 1948, workers in the country who could not 
produce a certificate of birth on the island were being ‘discharged’ from their employment.111 
The process was slowest on tea plantations, where the majority of Indians worked, and the 
government focused on ousting clerical and technical workers of Indian origin, while retaining 
Indian labourers.112  
In the same period, Ceylon’s legislature passed a raft of legislation designed to restrict 
movement into the country and to encourage people of Indian origin to leave. The Ceylon 
Immigrants and Emigrants Act, passed in 1948, required foreigners to hold passports and obtain 
visas or permits to enter or work in the country. As with the other measures, an exemption was 
provided for labourers on plantations, the largest population of Indians in the country: they 
could travel with documentation from the Superintendent of an Estate.113 The following year, 
the Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act provided a route to citizenship for Indians 
and Pakistanis in Ceylon in theory, but in practice restricted the ability of people of Indian or 
Pakistani origin to claim citizenship, by instituting a minimum income requirement, by 
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requiring ‘uninterrupted’ residence in Ceylon over a period of seven to ten years, or by insisting 
that claims to citizenship be validated by documentary evidence. In a context in which work 
was irregular, labourers moved between southern India and Ceylon regularly, births were rarely 
registered with authorities, and paperwork relating to migration, employment, and education 
was rarely kept, these provisions made it extremely difficult for Indians and Pakistanis to claim 
citizenship in Ceylon.114 The government of Ceylon did not hide the fact that the aim was to 
reduce the number of people of Indian origin in the country, and to restrict the rights of those 
who remained by, in particular by keeping them from voting.  
As the new citizenship regime emerged, it left an estimated 900,000 overseas Indians in 
Ceylon in an indeterminate state: they had to apply for citizenship of either India or Ceylon. 
The Government of Ceylon contended that these people, regardless of the fact that many were 
second or third generation migrants, were Indian citizens. In practice, the Government of India 
generally accepted the applications of those who applied for Indian citizenship, even though 
its official position was that it was under no obligation to do so.115 The High Commissioner in 
Colombo stressed that applications for Indian citizenship had to be ‘wholly voluntary’, again 
underlining India’s insistence on abiding by the will of the person concerned in this question.116 
He received instructions from New Delhi that ‘documentary evidence’ proving the applicant 
fulfilled the requirements of Indian nationality ‘need not be insisted on’, and the High 
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Commissioner should consider the application of anyone wishing to voluntarily return to India 
‘leniently.’117 
The sticking point was those who applied for citizenship of Ceylon, because the Government 
of Ceylon was not keen to accept them. For this group, the Government of India’s position was 
that they would be ‘stateless’. While this has been interpreted as a sign of the Indian 
government abandoning overseas Indians, the opposite is in fact the case: this political position 
put pressure on the Government in Colombo to accept the presence of Indians on the island. 
Crucially, it came at the recommendation of prominent members of the Tamil community and 
the Ceylon Indian Congress. The President of the CIC, S. Thondaman, repeatedly described 
Indians on the island as being in a state of ‘imposed statelessness’, and argued that their status 
could only be remedied by the Government of Ceylon accepting them as citizens.118 C.C. Desai, 
High Commissioner for India in Ceylon noted that several prominent Tamil politicians had 
recommended this course of action, including Senator S. Nadesan, and two Members of 
Parliament, C. Suntharalingam, and G.G. Ponnambalam, who was also President of the Ceylon 
Tamil Congress.119 The Government of India’s representatives in Ceylon recognised, consulted 
and coordinated with these individuals and organisations, even as they made the case that the 
problem of stateless people on the island was, in the words of S. Thondaman, ‘Ceylon’s 
domestic problem… which must be solved in a democratic manner without twisting it as an 
international problem.’120 This was a delicate dance, in which Indian representatives 
coordinated with overseas Indians to demand the Government of Ceylon grant them rights as 
citizens of Ceylon.   
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The dance continued throughout the 1950s, across an agreement between the two premiers, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and John Kotelawala, in the early part of 1954, which was meant to resolve 
the problem. According to the Nehru-Kotelawala Pact, the 900,000 Ceylon Indians were to 
apply for citizenship of the country of their choice. Kotelawala committed his country to trying 
to review all applications within two years. It was also agreed that those who received Ceylon 
citizenship would go on an electoral register and be allowed to vote in elections, while those 
who did not would be entered on a separate roll. The Pact included provisions allowing the 
Ceylon government to provide ‘inducements’ for people of Indian origin to seek Indian 
citizenship.121  
When, after a few months, it became clear that Ceylon was rejecting more than seventy-five 
percent of applicants, New Delhi expressed its ‘deep concern’ about how Ceylon was 
interpreting its own citizenship law. The Government of India’s complaint alleged that, ‘Most 
of the rejections... have been on purely technical or legalistic grounds such as failure to spell 
names properly.’122 While the official position was that Ceylon had the absolute right to 
determine its citizens, the Government of India insisted that this right be negotiated, and it 
monitored the implementation of Ceylon’s laws, and inserted itself into the process when it felt 
the procedures were unfair.  
The final chapter in the saga of the stateless Indians was opened after Nehru died, when Lal 
Bahadur Shastri negotiated an agreement with Sirimayo Bandaranaike, covering people of 
Indian origin without citizenship. According to the new accord, India promised to grant 
citizenship to 525,000 people of Indian origin, while Ceylon was to take 300,000 of them, 
leaving a further 150,000 whose status would be the subject of ongoing negotiations. 
Repatriation of Indian citizens was set to take place over fifteen years. The Government of 
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India set aside Rs.37 crore (Rs.370 million) to rehabilitate the repatriates, and dusted off 
resettlement schemes from the era of the partition refugee crisis, hoping to settle these new 
citizens in Dandakaranya, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and other parts of the country in 
need of labour.123 Once again, sub-national pressures affected this decision: the Government 
of Madras, eager to colonise the Nicobar islands, had been pressing the Government of India 
since 1959 to repatriate estate labour from Ceylon to help with this project.124 
In sum, India did not simply adopt a territorialised approach to citizenship in 1947. Instead, 
officials in New Delhi as well as official representatives on the ground, engaged in a decades-
long negotiation on behalf of all overseas Indians, whether they were citizens or not. While 
different rhetorical strategies were used in the period up until Nehru’s death in May 1964, 
India’s focus was on determining the will of the persons concerned, and insisting that Indians 
should not be coerced into leaving the country in which they resided. India remained actively 
engaged with overseas Indians, even as it tried to secure for them citizenship or at least 
residency rights in Burma or Ceylon. This was complemented by layered expressions of 




Indians helped establish the organisations that represented overseas Indians in Burma and 
Ceylon, shaped the claims that they made on their host governments, and strategised with them 
about how best to fight their corner. We have seen that in 1939 Jawaharlal Nehru helped 
establish the Ceylon Indian Congress. After independence, the strong connection between the 
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two Congresses remained. V.V. Giri, while serving as High Commissioner for India in Ceylon 
in the late 1940s, attended the annual sessions of the CIC, where, along with other prominent 
Indian visitors, including the former Premier of Madras T. Prakasam, and the Kashmiri 
politician Shaffi Mohammed, he hoisted the tricolour and sang Bande Mataram.125 After the 
All-Burma Indian Conference (later Congress) was established in December 1947,126 it 
received visits and messages of support from Indian leaders. For example, in 1954, Nehru sent 
a telegram to the Congress’ annual session urging the Indians of Burma to be ‘ambassadors of 
India’ and to work for ‘friendly and cooperative relations between the peoples of the two 
countries’.127  
The purposes of these Congresses were deliciously ambiguous. On the one hand, they were 
a mechanism through which the will of the Indian people in Burma and Ceylon could be 
ascertained and conveyed to the Governments of these countries. Nehru explained to his High 
Commissioner in Ceylon, K.P. Kesava Menon, ‘we have recognized them as representatives of 
the great mass of Indians in Ceylon.’128 Beyond the question of representation, the question of 
influence was more nuanced. Because these Congresses were separate organisations, the 
Government of India’s official position was that it had no influence over them. And yet, 
members of the CIC, for example, openly sought advice from the Government of India. Indeed, 
Nehru would advise the High Commissioner in Colombo during a particularly tense period on 
the island that, ‘it must not be made to appear to the Ceylon government that there are 
differences between us and that our advice has not been accepted by the Ceylon Congress.’129  
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As Indians in Ceylon and Burma navigated the new nationalist regimes’ rules, the demands 
made by the bodies that represented Indians tended to reflect Indian positions and priorities. 
Thus, as Burma drafted its rules for democratic representation, the All-Burma Indian Congress 
declared it would not seek ‘any particular constitutional privilege or position’, echoing the 
Indian National Congress’s dislike of separate electorates. Meanwhile, the Government of 
Burma declared that it would ‘afford members of the Indian community equal opportunities… 
in securing representation in the Parliament’ and promised to take ‘special care’ to look after 
minority interests.130 That the ruling party would see that minorities were represented and their 
interests protected was precisely the position of the Indian National Congress.  
In Ceylon, there was not such comity of views. Instead, the Government in Colombo sought 
to disenfranchise some 200,000 Indians, removing their right to vote by declaring them non-
nationals. In response, in the summer of 1952, the CIC launched a satyagraha ‘to secure the 
removal of all discriminatory legislation against the Indian Community in Ceylon’. The 
demand clearly echoed the Government of India’s language of non-discrimination. Moreover, 
the CIC opened its membership to ‘all communities irrespective of caste, creed or race’.131 As 
it braced for the start of the movement, the Government of Ceylon sent a note to the 
Government of India delivered via the High Commissioner, Kesava Menon, in which it 
recorded that ‘it would be appropriate for the Government of India to persuade the [Ceylon 
Indian] Congress to call off the satyagraha’.132 Although the Indian Government declined to do 
so, the key point to note is that both governments recognised the relationship between the CIC 
and the Government of India. Underscoring this connection, during the course of negotiations 
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later in the year about draft legislation on the matter, a delegation from the CIC travelled to 
Delhi to meet prominent members of the government.133  
In other words, far from renouncing all obligations to overseas Indians, independent India 
continued to recognise institutional mechanisms for maintaining contact. Its responsibility 
extended to advising overseas Indians on the language to use and the strategies to adopt to 
make their case to the governments of Burma and Ceylon. In this layered practice of 
sovereignty, India’s expression of sovereignty extended to the sub-national recognition of 
representative bodies of overseas Indians in other countries, and its responsibility included 




The third area where the Government of India took responsibility for overseas Indians 
concerned property. As the new regime of citizenship emerged, Indians outside of the elevated 
circles of the Ministry of External Affairs in the Government of India staked a claim to the 
wealth of Ceylon and Burma, citing the contribution of Indians to the development of each 
country.134 At the sub-national level therefore, Indian expressions of sovereignty extended to 
the wealth of Indians outside of India. When the property rights of people of Indian origin in 
Burma or Ceylon were threatened or curtailed, the Government of India took up the case. 
For example, the Government of Ceylon repeatedly put restrictions on remittances from 
Indians in Ceylon to their families back in India. Many plantation workers married women 
back in South India and schooled their children there too, so when they could not send money 
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home, their families in India felt the pinch.  In 1949, as part of their campaign to deny Indians 
a claim to stay on the island, the Government of Ceylon required those who wished to remit 
money to India to obtain a permit to do so. In order to acquire the permit, those sending money 
had to declare themselves a temporary resident of Ceylon. Doing so would disqualify these 
Indians from making any claim to citizenship of Ceylon.135 The rule initially applied to all 
Sterling Area nationals except Britons.136 The Government of India seized upon this fact to 
allege that the policy was discriminatory. While acknowledging that Ceylon had every right to 
place controls on its currency, the High Commissioner warned that such controls ‘should not 
be used as a means of driving out the Indian nationals from Ceylon.’137 Ceylon responded to 
these allegations by altering the policy so that it covered Britons as well. The result was a 
somewhat back-handed victory for India: it won the argument on discrimination, but was not 
able to lift the burden of the new policy from Indians in Ceylon.  
In Burma, the Government of India was moved to protect propertied interests more than 
once. After independence, Burma’s new government pursued a progressive plan of land 
reforms, which included acquisition of land with limited compensation, restrictions on the sale 
and transfer of land, as well as limits on rent. This programme affected Nakarattar Chettiar 
landowners, originally from Madras.138 A deputation of Indian landowners in Burma visited 
the Governor of Madras in October 1948 to plead for India to act on their behalf. They declared 
they ‘would be agreeable to any settlement regarding compensation which the Government of 
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India would consider reasonable and equitable.’ The Governor of Madras agreed to take the 
matter up with the Government of India. 139  
Eventually, in the middle of 1950, a delegation, headed by the Indian Ambassador to Burma, 
M.A. Raud, travelled to Rangoon to negotiate with Thakin Nu’s government. The Indian 
representatives made it clear that they ‘heartily endorsed the scheme of nationalisation’, but 
were keen to ensure greater compensation for landlords.140 Instead, India’s position centred on 
the question of discrimination against Indian landlords. Shortly after Raud had visited Burma, 
a return delegation visited India, with Thakin Maung, the leader of the delegation, assuring the 
press that, ‘All landlords in Burma, irrespective of their nationality, would be treated on the 
same footing for the purpose of land nationalisation’.141 When the Land Nationalisation Act of 
1948 was replaced in 1953 with a bill allowing for reduced compensation, the Chettiars 
organised again. By this time they and their advocates in India had adopted the language of 
non-discrimination. The South India Chamber of Congress telegrammed Nehru to complain, 
‘The Bill is discriminatory because the compensation of one year’s land revenue mentioned in 
it mostly affects Indians.’142 Here again, it is evident that the norm of non-discrimination was 
gaining widespread purchase in this period, even if just as a rhetorical device.    
Finally, when Ne Win’s Union Revolutionary Council took power in 1962 and initiated a 
programme of mass nationalisation, up to 20,000 businessmen and small traders of Indian 
origin were affected. In 1964, the government announced that all foreign property would be 
nationalised, and that all those with a Foreigners’ Registration Certificate would have to leave 
the country. When the issue was raised in India’s Lok Sabha, Dinesh Singh, the Deputy 
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Minister of External Affairs promised that ‘the Government of India are fully alive to the 
seriousness of this problem’, and noted that they had liberalised customs measures, and put on 
extra boats and more flights from Burma to assist people who were fleeing the country. But, 
he concluded, ‘All these measures that have been taken… are not directed against Indians as 
such but are applied to the foreigners in Burma.’143 In other words, they did not violate the 
norm that had guided Indian intervention since independence, that of non-discrimination.  
In a rambunctious debate, while the government focused on the narrow question of whether 
Indians were being discriminated against, MPs stressed the wider issue of Indians being 
mistreated. Yashpal Singh asked in Hindi, ‘How long will the government tolerate Indians in 
every country being pushed out?’144 Hari Vishnu Kamath lamented, ‘India is being kicked by 
Ceylon; India is being kicked by Burma; India is being kicked by Pakistan; India is being 
kicked by China. What are they [the government] doing sitting and moping?’145 The Prime 
Minister, who was in ill health and would pass away just one month later, spoke up only to 
note that ‘All these laws have been passed for all foreigners and not only for Indians.’146 The 
Government of India did put ‘gentle’ pressure to ensure that the Indians affected by the 
nationalisation laws ‘should be rehabilitated and compensated’,147 but non-discrimination 
remained the primary basis upon which New Delhi’s foreign policy establishment reacted to 
the moves in Burma, even as several constituents raised their voices to demand a more 
expansive policy.    
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Meanwhile as Indians poured out of the country a rather more capacious understanding of 
India’s responsibility briefly opened up. When it transpired that Indians leaving Burma would 
not be permitted to take cash or jewellery as they departed, India’s foreign secretary Y.D. 
Gundevia suggested that the Indian Embassy in Rangoon might take possession of their 
movable property. The Embassy did, ‘pending a settlement between the two Governments on 
the final disposition of these assets.’148 Indians departing the country began leaving their cash 
and jewellery at the Embassy, from where it was deposited in a vault at the People’s Bank of 





Despite its rhetoric, independent India did not renounce its responsibility for overseas Indians. 
It kept looking for solutions to help them fight discrimination well into the 1960s. It sought to 
shape solutions at the multilateral level, an effort that converged and overlapped with its larger 
attempt to develop the norms and rules that would govern the emerging international order, 
along new universal principles and through overarching frameworks. India promoted, in 
particular, three norms as it sought to solve problem of overseas Indians: the mechanism of 
inter-state negotiation to solve the future of non-citizen minorities, as opposed to unilateral 
action; the primacy of the will of the people regarding their place of residence; and the necessity 
of non-discriminatory laws or rules as regards non-citizen minorities. Though comprehensive 
solutions evaded it, the Government of India continued to engage with the situation of overseas 
Indians in its neighbourhood through less visible means in bilateral negotiations.  
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To what extent was India’s treatment of overseas Indians Burma and Ceylon unique, 
compared to other parts of the British empire? This is a question for other scholars to answer 
in full, but we have hints that the social networks and the political imaginaries of the era of 
empire had a similar resilience elsewhere. We see patterns of behaviour that indicate not only 
that overseas Indians had a shared approach to their problems, but that Indians across the world 
were keen to maintain their links with one another and with India. For example, representatives 
of overseas Indians from Mauritius, Jamaica, British Guiana, Fiji and elsewhere met in London 
more than once in the 1940s and 1950s. In June 1953, they held a two-day conference where 
they defined their ‘rights and duties’. They passed a resolution pledging to ‘look upon their 
adopted country as their homeland’, and calling on those host countries to guarantee ‘equal 
rights and privileges’ with all other citizens.150 The language was nearly identical to that 
promoted by New Delhi in Ceylon and Burma. Further research might determine whether 
Indian Government representatives or senior Congressmen were behind this conference and its 
declaration.  
While senior Indian politicians helped established institutions in Burma and Ceylon, they 
also set up links back on the subcontinent. S.K. Patil, prominent Congressman and later 
colossus of the Party, founded the Brihad Bharatiya Samaj in the early 1950s. In 1954, the 
Brihad Bharatiya Samaj set up a ‘centre for fostering cultural relations between the people of 
India and Indians settled abroad’. Far from cutting off all ties, Indians were building new 
institutions to remake existing networks for the new age. The Centre had a building in Bombay, 
with a library, a meeting hall and accommodation. Patil said he expected the Centre to act as a 
“clearing house” for overseas Indians arriving in the city.151 Given the role that the Congress 
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Party had played as a conduit for information and as a proxy for official government action, 
this institution is worth a further look.  
Thirdly, the Government of India maintained tabs on Indians overseas, their conditions and 
legislation relating to them. We know most about this in East Africa, where Indian leaders 
worked behind the scenes in shaping, as far as possible, the fate of Indians in Kenya and 
Uganda, as well as in Britain. Famously, Nehru appointed Apa Pant as India’s representative 
in Kenya. Pant’s creative and extensive work to foster good relations between Indians and 
Kenyans is well documented.152 The authors would suggest that, in spite of Pant’s idiosyncratic 
approach, it can be understood as part of the Government of India’s efforts to avoid the kind 
of conflicts that it had had to cope with in Ceylon and Burma. Staying with Kenya, as British 
officials negotiated with the country in the late 1960s over the fate of overseas Indians there, 
India maintained the same public position on overseas Indians as Nehru had articulated two 
decades before. Still, British officials are reported to have ‘believed India was saying one thing 
but doing another’.153 A few years later, India was central to negotiations over where Ugandan 
Asians would be sent when they were expelled from Uganda in the 1970s.154 There are hints, 
too, that the Government of India did not limit this kind of involvement to the Indian Ocean. It 
may have overseen repatriation of Indians from Fiji, as they arrived by the boatload in Calcutta 
in 1949.155 It is reasonable to ask whether the Government of India or the Congress Party were 
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working, as they had done elsewhere, to help Indians stay in Fiji in the decades after 1947, or 
in British Guiana or any other territory.   
In light of India’s engagement with its diaspora through the two decades after independence 
and beyond, it is clear that the dominant narrative, according to which India completely cut ties 
with overseas Indians at independence, is simply unsustainable. More research can shed light 
on whether the same norms and practices of sovereignty that guided Indian action in Ceylon 
and Burma applied elsewhere.  
With these new perspectives on this relationship between state and diasporic communities, 
this article qualifies a common view of the construction of postcolonial states and the 
development of their understanding of sovereignty. It shows that, in its engagements with 
overseas Indians, independent India practiced a layered form of sovereignty. This post-imperial 
sovereignty retained a certain continuity in independent India’s relation to sovereignty with the 
colonial period. It was expressed on multiple levels, including through multi-national 
negotiations, and also through sub-national demands. After independence, it became a post-
imperial conception of sovereignty by being consubstantially linked with India’s desire to forge 
global norms and shared principles.  
 
 
